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Until recent years, the contract clause' of the Constitution was
thought to be a dead letter.2 After vigorous application in the nine-
teenth century,3 the clause 4-along with other judicial devices for pro-
tecting economic rights-fell into disuse in the late 1930s.6 During
the following four decades, the Supreme Court invoked the clause
only twice.7 In 1977, however, the Court invalidated the repeal of a
public bond covenant on grounds of contract impairment.8 The fol-
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall . . .pass any . . . Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts .. ")
2. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
PART II. THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 306 (1965) (contract clause "has . . . been reduced to a
minor organic provision in the constitutional law of the twentieth century"); Hale, The
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HARV. L. REV. 852, 890-91 (1944)
("results might be the same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitution"
and supplanted by due process clause); cf. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (Court has "balanc[ed] away the plain guarantee" of the
contract clause).
3. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court used the contract clause more often
than any other constitutional provision to invalidate state legislation. By the 1930s, the
Court had turned primarily to the due process clause as the basis for judicial review of
economic legislation. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACr CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 91-100 (1938).
4. The contract clause is one of the few provisions of the Constitution that provide
specific protection for economic rights. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the federal government and the states from depriving persons of property without due
process and from taking property without just compensation. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV.
Other provisions, such as the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, may protect indi-
vidual economic rights indirectly. See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,
375 U.S. 361 (1964) (out-of-state milk distributor protected by commerce clause invalida-
tion of state milk regulations).
5. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-96 (9th ed. 1975)
(tracing rise in late nineteenth century and decline in 1930s of judicial application of
substantive due process to economic regulation); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34 (describing
virtual abdication by Supreme Court of due process and equal protection review of
economic legislation).
6. In upholding a state mortgage-foreclosure moratorium in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the Supreme Court recognized "the necessity of finding
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare." 290
U.S. at 442. This recognition of the legitimacy of direct economic regulation marked the
turning point in the Court's application of the contract clause.
7. Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S.
95 (1938). Neither law was a typical case of impairment. The law invalidated in Brand
implicated free speech rights. See id. at 107-09. The law invalidated in Wood involved
the special case of title to state granted land, and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810), required its invalidation. See 313 U.S. at 368-69.
8. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey since 1962 had issued bonds with a statutory covenant re-
stricting its involvement in mass transit operations. In 1973 and 1974, with suddenly
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lowing year, the Court overturned a state pension law as imposing
unbargained-for obligations upon a party to a private contract. 9 These
decisions have signaled a new activism in the Supreme Court's use
of the contract clause to protect economic rights.'0
The Supreme Court has offered few clues indicating the extent of
this new activism." Its two recent opinions relied upon inconsistent
approaches to contract clause jurisprudence, 2 and neither opinion
worsening energy problems and increasing concern over environmental and urban-trans-
portation issues, the New York and New Jersey legislatures repealed the covenant, first
prospectively and then retroactively, to permit use of Port Authority facilities for new
mass transit projects. New Jersey state courts found that repeal of the covenant had af-
fected the bonds' security only nominally and had not harmed their secondary market
value. They upheld the repeal as a legitimate exercise of the states' police power. United
States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975), afJ'd, 69 N.J. 253, 353
A.2d 514 (1976). The Supreme Court found a substantial impairment of security and
reversed: repeal was not reasonable, in that the problems at which it was directed were
foreseen when the covenant was passed, 431 U.S. at 31-32, and the law was not necessary,
in that less drastic means were itvailable to pursue the states' ends, id. at 29-31.
9. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). A Minnesota law re-
quired any company of one hundred employees or more that maintained a pension plan
and closed an office in the state, to fund pensions for employees of at least ten years,
even if the pension rights under the plan did not vest at ten-years' service. Although the
law was preempted by federal pension legislation less than a year after its passage,
the state imposed a $185,000 "pension-funding charge" on Allied Structural Steel Co. A
three-judge federal district court found the law constitutional as applied to the company.
Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977). Without indicating precisely what
test it was applying, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that the impairment
was sudden, severe, retroactive, and permanent, 438 U.S. at 244-47, 250, and concluded that
the statute operated in a previously unregulated field and Was not directed at a public
emergency or broad societal interest, id. at 247-50. Those factors rendered the law un-
constitutional.
10. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 251, 259 (1978) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (decision "greatly expands the reach of the Clause" and "threatens to un-
dermine the jurisprudence of property rights developed over the last 40 years"); United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 33 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (decision
creates "a constitutional safe haven for property rights embodied in a contract"); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-3, at 49, 50 (Supp. 1979) (revival of contract
clause "may become part of a significant new trend" and "could be seen as another sign
of the Court's growing solicitude for the interests of corporate capitalism").
In 1979, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its renewed commitment to a strong contract
clause by summarily affirming a lower court decision that invalidated the Spannaus law
as applied in circumstances similar to those of Spannaus. White Motor Corp. v. Malone,
599 F.2d 283 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem., 100 S. Ct. 223 (1979).
11. In United States Trust Co., the Court restricted the tests employed to cases in-
volving "purely financial" state contractual obligations. 431 U.S. at 25-26. The Spannaus
Court did not suggest that the factors emphasized would be relevant in all contract clause
cases, 438 U.S. at 249-51 & n.24, and seemed deliberately to avoid articulating any general
standard.
12. The opinions in United States Trust Co. and Spannaus are inconsistent in two
ways. First, in United States Trust Co., the Court stated that judicial deference to legis-
lative judgments is appropriate in private contract cases. 431 U.S. at 22-23. Yet in Spannaus,
the Court strictly scrutinized the challenged legislation, dismissing available evidence of
legislative purpose and making its own judgments as to reasonableness. 438 U.S. at 246
n.18, 248 n.19. Second, the Court in United States Trust Co. adopted a reasonableness-
and-necessity standard and interpreted it to require application of the foreseeability and
least drastic means tests. 431 U.S. at 29-32. In Spannaus, the Court used neither of the
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proposed an overall theory for construction or application of the
clause. In addition, the Court has made no effort to justify depart-
ing from its customary deference to legislative regulation of economic
rights.' 3
This Note advocates an approach to contract clause jurisprudence
by which a court would scrutinize the manner in which the legis-
lature has adopted the particular law, but would not intrude upon
the legislature's substantive policy judgment. After a brief examina-
tion of the framers' intent, the Note identifies several competing prin-
ciples that pervade contract clause doctrine and contends that the
Supreme Court's various approaches to interpretation of the clause
have failed to reconcile those principles. The Note then proposes a
process-oriented approach to application of the contract clause. The
objective of the scrutiny would be to ensure that political, not judi-
cial, checks operate to promote compliance with the principles un-
derlying the clause.
United States Trust Co. tests, but adopted instead an unstructured factor-based balancing
approach. 438 U.S. at 250; see Note, Revival of the Contract Clause: Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus and United States Trust Co. v, New Jersey, 65 VA. L. REv. 377, 395-96
(1979) (comparing United States Trust Co. and Spannaus).
13. With respect to policy judgments, the Court adopted a deferential approach in
contract clause cases in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934)
("Whether the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question with which
we are not concerned.") With respect to legislative judgments of necessity, the Court
articulated a similar approach in East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233
(1945) ("[o]nce we are in this domain of the reserve power of a State we must respect
the 'wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is
not necessary' ") (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905)). Similarly, the
leading post-1930s contract clause case, City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965)
(upholding elimination of reinstatement rights for defaulting purchasers of certain state
lands), deferred to legislative judgments of purpose and need.
The recent departure from this judicial deference in the realm of economic rights is
particularly striking in light of the Burger Court's respect for federalism and its usual
deference to legislative choices. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100
S. Ct. 2035 (1980) (deference to state constitutional free speech provision against tak-
ings clause); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (only invidious
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, cannot stand consistently with Fourteenth Amend-
ment); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849, 852 (1976) (congressionally
imposed displacement of traditional state governmental functions inconsistent with
federalism).
The Burger Court has shown some willingness, however, to find constitutional protec-
tion against government action abridging economic rights under provisions other than
the contract clause. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979) (prohi-
bition of refusal to permit public access to marina created from private pond is com-
pensable taking); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (First Amendment protects pharmacists' "purely economic" interest
in advertising). The Court's approach has not, however, been unswervingly protective of
individual economic rights. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (designation of Grand Central Terminal as landmark not a taking); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (retroactive requirement that coal mining
companies pay benefits to miners striken with black lung disease held not violative of
due process).
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I. Rejection of Literalism
Neither the constitutional text nor the intent of the framers' 4 pro-
vides much guidance in interpreting the contract clause. The clause
was directed narrowly at forms of debtor-relief legislation thought to
have contributed to the economic troubles of the 1780s,'- and it gen-
erated little discussion at the Philadelphia Convention'; or during
the state ratification process. 17 The framers appear to have given al-
most no thought to the broad implications of the language.',
Although it has applied the contract clause to many laws other than
debtor-relief laws, the Supreme Court has long rejected a literalist
reading.' 9 The conclusive step in the repudiation of literalism was the
Court's adoption in the late nineteenth century of two principles that
drastically restricted the reach of the contract clause.2 0 Those principles
were that private contracts are made subject to the state's retained police
power (the "reserved power" doctrine),2 ' and that public contracts are
made subject to the state's constitutional inability to alienate its police
powers (the "inalienability" doctrine).2 2 The introduction of those doc-
trines greatly softened the apparent command of the contract clause that
14. See Johnson, The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, 16 KY. L.J.
222, 222 (1928).
15. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 10 (Convention records throw little light upon the
meaning of text); see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934)
(Convention debates "of little aid" in construing clause).
16. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 12 (discussion of clause in state ratifying conventions
and pamphlet literature was rare).
17. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1934); see B. WRIGHT,
sutpra note 3, at 1-16 (discussing debtor-relief laws common in 1780s and analyzing framers'
intent).
18. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 5 (contract clause not regarded with great concern
either by framers or Anti-Federalists). "[T]he men of 1787-1788 were not so greatly con-
cerned about the contract clause as would be expected, and . . . although some of them
were definitely of the opinion that it applied primarily as against stay laws, or laws
permitting debtors to pay their creditors in some kind of commodity other than money,
most of them seem to confuse this clause with the monetary provisions of Section 10."
Id. at 15.
19. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240 (1978) ("Clause
is not ... the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply"); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (prohibition not to be read with literal
exactness) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934)).
20. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1-3), 57 HARv. L. REV.
512, 621, 852 (1944) (reviewing development of contract clause doctrine).
21. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) ("reser.
ration of essential attributes of sovereign power is . . . read into contracts as a postulate
of the legal order"); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (contract clause does
not prevent state from exercise of police powers for public good).
22. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (state may protect public
welfare notwithstanding interference with public contracts); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.




contract rights were to be protected in preference to other substan-
tive values. Interpretation of the clause became virtually independent
of intent and text.23
II. Principles of Contract Clause Jurisprudence
Since the introduction of the reserved power and inalienability
doctrines, interpretation of the contract clause has focused on com-
peting principles of public power and private right.24 In particular,
contract clause cases pose the question of how to reconcile the no-
tion that government should be held to its word, with the idea that
retroactive legislation to pursue public goals is a necessary product
of modern government.
In interpreting the clause, the Supreme Court has emphasized both
competing substantive concerns and constraints upon institutional
roles. Analysis of the Court's pronouncements suggests several general
principles that can help resolve the conflict of substantive values and
indicate the proper limits on judicial application of the clause.
A. Private Expectations
A central concern of the Supreme Court in contract clause cases
has been to protect legitimate contract-based expectations from gov-
ernment interference.2 5 That concern has rested on two principles:
that a state is estopped from dishonoring its commitment that a con-
tractual obligation recognized by it will remain secure; 26 and that
23. This type of interpretation is similar to that given to the more "indeterminate"
provisions of the Constitution. Cf. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049, 1088-94 (1979) ("due
process" and "equal protection" too indeterminate for literalist adjudication); Ely, The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 5, 5 & n.3 (1978) (interpretation of certain provisions, including equal protection
clause, privileges or immunities clause, and Ninth Amendment, requires sources beyond
text and intention of drafters).
24. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 258.
25. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978) (Allied
had reasonable and legitimate contractual expectation); United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977) (repeal of bond covenant is serious disruption of
bondholders' legitimate expectations).
26. In Professor Tribe's formulation of this estoppel principle, "the most basic pur-
poses of the impairment clause, as well as notions of fairness that transcend the clause
itself, point to a simple constitutional principle: government must keep its word." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-7, at 470 (1978). In a public-contract case,
the state has expressly given its word. In a private-contract case, the state guarantee is
implicit, based upon reading into the contract the "contemporaneous state law pertaining
to interpretation and enforcement." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I,
19 n.17 (1977); see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 259 (1827) (state law read
into contracts).
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there is a legitimate expectation that a private arrangement will not
be disturbed without special justification.2 7 The first principle pro-
tects justified reliance upon state assurances of security; 28 the second
principle protects the individual autonomy and independence that
the institution of contract is designed, in part, to foster.29 A state's
impairment of a contract can both disturb reliance upon a commit-
ment of security and upset expectations of government noninterference.
Other aspects of contract clause jurisprudence limit these two
strands of the expectations notion. The recognition that contract
rights affect the public interest 30 substantially qualifies the idea that
abridgment of contract rights unduly intrudes upon expectations
of personal autonomy.31 The reserved power and inalienability doc-
trines, which authorize a state to break even an express commitment,3
2
and the justifications for retroactive legislation,33 limit the principle
that reliance upon state assurances may not be upset. With these quali-
fications, though, contract-based expectations constitute the private in-
terest with which the contract clause has been, and should continue to
be, centrally concerned.
27. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978) ("Contracts
enable individuals to order their personal and business affairs according to their par-
ticular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under
the law, and the parties are entitled to rely on them.") The legitimacy of expectations
of government noninterference is also the Supreme Court's primary concern in deciding
whether a challenged law enters a new field of regulation. See id. at 250 (challenged law
not operating in area subject to state regulation at time of contract formation); Veix v.
Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (relevant to law's validity that
complainant had "purchased into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to
which he now objects").
28. Justified reliance has long been a notion fundamental to contract law. See, e.g.,
IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 193-209 (1963 & Supp. 1980); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1932).
29. See M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 74-79 (1933) (institution of contract
serves values of personal autonomy and liberty); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPON-
SIBILITY 45 (1968) (institution of contract allows individuals to control and predict future).
30. This notion is implicit in the principle that prospective conditioning of contractual
obligations is valid. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (contract clause
applies only to laws affecting existing contracts, not to laws setting conditions on con-
tracts made after the law's enactment).
31. Intrusions in the form of restrictions on the liberty of contract are not barred by
the contract clause. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827). Interference
with the liberty to form contracts, however, may be invalid under the due process
clause, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (due process clause protects
liberty of contract), though the justification required under the due process clause for
such action has been minimal since 1937, see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 391-400 (1937) (establishing deferential rationality standard for due process challenges
to economic legislation).
32. See notes 21 & 22 supra. By permitting interference with private arrangements,
those doctrines also limit the personal-autonomy strand of the expectations notion.
33. See note 54 infra.
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An approach to contract clause analysis that focused on legitimate
expectations, however, would have to determine which expectations
were legitimate, in the sense of being constitutionally protected. Yet,
except in cases that involved laws closely resembling laws whose validity
had already been adjudicated under the contract clause,34 the Court
could not assume that legitimate expectations were clearly defined.
Actual expectations 35 could not be the measure of legitimacy without
restricting the scope of public power preserved under the reserved
power and inalienability doctrines; neither doctrine, however, has
limited the areas in which public power may legitimately be exercised,
even if that exercise effects a contractual impairment.3 6 In most cases,
therefore, the Court would necessarily focus, not on the contracting
parties' expectations, but rather on the justification offered by the state
for the impairment.37 Though the protection of contractual expecta-
tions is an important concern, contract clause analysis should not adopt
the protection of expectations as the guiding operational principle.
34. The Court might safely assume that any legislation closely resembling a law pre-
viously upheld against a contract clause challenge would violate no legitimate expecta-
tions. One example would be laws concerning health, safety, or morals powers, which
were involved in the cases in which the reserved power and inalienability doctrines were
formulated. E.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (regulation
of public water supply); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (lottery regulation);
Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877) (liquor regulation). Another example
would be legislation affecting the state's administration of its legal system. E.g., Gelfert v.
National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941) (modification of deficiency judgment procedures);
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 553 (1866) (states may modify own
procedure provided no substantial contract right impaired); cf. United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977) (modification of statutes governing remedies much
less likely to upset expectations than law adjusting express terms of contract).
Similarly, the Court could assume that a law very similar to one already overturned as
effecting an unconstitutional impairment would upset legitimate expectations. One ex-
ample would be legislation repealing a state's grant of title to property. E.g., Wood v.
Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941) (repeal of law establishing title to land sold by state); Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (repeal of state land grant). Another example would
be a state's refusal to repay borrowed money. E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of
New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909) (state restriction of municipality's taxing power re-
sulting in municipality's default on bonds); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880)
(same).
35. Actual expectations with respect to the particular impairment may be nonexistent.
For example, the parties to the land-sale contracts in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379
U.S. 497 (1965), probably did not contemplate the possibility of legal title confusion
resulting from the existence of reinstatement rights, the possibility of oil and gas dis-
coveries, or the possibility of rapidly increasing population; they therefore probably did
not expect elimination of reinstatement rights.
36. The reserved power and inalienability doctrines have defined broad, not narrow,
categories of legitimate state action. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 25 (1978) (impairment valid if reasonable and necessary to serve important public
purpose); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934) (contract clause
does not prohibit exercise of state powers for promotion of common weal).
37. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
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B. The Scope of Public Power
The reserved power and inalienability doctrines establish that a
necessary exercise of public power may impair private expectations
of contractual security without violating the Constitution. A court
must focus on whether the public purpose adopted by the state re-
quires impairment of particular contracts. If impairment is not neces-
sary to achieve that purpose, or if selection of the particular group
of contract parties to bear the burden of fulfilling the public purpose
is inappropriate, the court may overturn the legislation.
1. Public Purpose
By adopting the reserved power and inalienability doctrines, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that existing contract rights must give
way in a conflict with the public interest.38 Though the Court ini-
tially limited state power by defining narrowly both the interests that
a state could protect as public and the interests that a state could
declare affected by exercise of otherwise-private contract rights, 39
both limits have gradually been eroded. The Court has subsequently
recognized that a state may legitimately protect a virtually limitless
range of interests that conflict with economic rights4 0 and that all
economic interests, particularly contractual relationships, can affect
38. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (police power paramount to
private-contract rights); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 285 (existing contractual rights
must yield to police power). Theories of property rights have similarly recognized the
justifiability of public regulation of property use. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 523 (1934) (government may regulate to prevent harmful consequences of exercise
of individual economic rights); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85
(1851) ("[E]very holder of property . . . holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it . . . shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others . . ."); Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152, 162 (1971) (external effects
of property use may constitutionally be restrained).
39. The range of nonproperty interests that could be protected in the public interest
was initially restricted to public health, safety, morals, and a narrowly conceived general
welfare. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 195-213; Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitu-
tional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1022, 1042 (1978).
40. The broad formulations that the Court gave the reserved power and inalienability
doctrines permitted it to expand their scope. In Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U.S. 170 (1921) (upholding rent-control law), and Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding mortgage-foreclosure moratorium), the Supreme Court
recognized the legitimacy of direct state intervention into private economic relations in
order to protect individuals from financial hardship. Later, the Court further expanded
the scope of "public welfare"; given the paucity of contract clause cases after 1937, the
expansion occurred primarily in cases iniolving other constitutional provisions. See, e.g,
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (legislation to
preserve character and aesthetic features of city improves public welfare); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (public welfare includes spiritual and aesthetic, as well as
physical and monetary values).
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the public interest.4 ' The Court's doctrine implicitly includes the
general proposition that public power, properly exercised, is superior
to contract rights.4 2
The Court's focus has shifted, therefore, to two concerns: the state's
definition of a public purpose, and the manner in which it is pursued
in a particular case. Because there are few limits on the legitimacy of
public purposes, 43 inquiry into whether the state has adopted truly
public ends typically is perfunctory.4 4 The public-purpose require-
ment, however, is the critical predicate for infringement of individu-
al expectations; 45 the principal danger is that the legislation is serv-
ing only private interests. 46
41. See, e.g., East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945) (private contracts
exist in public context); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934)
(private contracts affect interests of state); M. COHEN, sukra note 29, at 78 (private contract
never devoid of all public interest).
A contract may affect the public interest in three ways. The rights of each party to a
contractual arrangement affect at least other parties' interests; preventing damage to
those interests may be a public goal. See, e.g., East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S.
230 (1945) (public purpose to protect mortgagors from foreclosure); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (same). Enforcement of a contract may also
harm third parties. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940)
(public purpose to protect savings and loan association depositors from shareholders'
exercise of withdrawal rights); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919)
(public purpose to protect dwellings in vicinity of oil storage tanks). Finally, enforcement
may merely stand in the way of promoting a public goal without being responsible for
harm to individuals. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
(bond covenant as obstacle to public purpose of improving mass transit); City of El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (public purpose to cure legal title confusion due to
maintenance of reinstatement rights on public land sales).
42. See Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 375 (1919).
43. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 106-07 (class of impermissible objectives is small).
44. The public purpose requirement "prohibit[s] a State from embarking on a policy
motivated by a simple desire to escape its financial obligations or to injure others through
'the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to en-
force them.'" United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 52 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934)). In
all cases involving a state breach of contract, however, the state advances a public purpose.
See, e.g., id. at 28-29 (state contends transportation, energy, and environmental goals
require impairment); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502
(1942) (financial emergency required reduction of municipal bondholders' rights).
45. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 108-09 (1938); Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 196 (1936).
46. See Bennett, supra note 23, at 1083 ("unalloyed personal favor is beyond the present
legislative pale"); cf. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 248-49 (1978)
(narrow focus of law generates suspicion of private interests being served); Treigle v.
Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1936) (challenged law dealt only with private
rights and not legitimate public end).
Protecting private interests could in some instances be adopted as a public purpose.
See A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 227 (1962) (legislative decision to foster
prisate interests as public goal legitimate); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1246-49 (1970) (rationality standard permits
promotion of private interest as public goal). A legislature may, however, wish to serve
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The second and more important element of public-purpose scrutiny
looks to means. The Court's decisions indicate that if the state of-
fers no policy justification for its selection of means and if a serious
defeat of expectations seems unnecessary, a court may invalidate the
legislation.47 If policies subsidiary to the primary purpose make the
selected means necessary, however, an impairment may be justified.4
Means-scrutiny under the contract clause, therefore, should require
that impairment be necessary, within the constraints set by subsidiary
policy choices, for achievement of the state's primary purpose.49
private interests without adopting their protection as a public end. In its unwillingness
to expose its true purposes, the legislature may then disingenuously attach a general
statement of public purpose. In such cases, the legislature will typically provide inade-
quate support for the purported connection between the general purpose and the action
taken. Several commentators have suggested that the rationality test-which scrutinizes
this connection-has been and should be used to invalidate legislation when suspicions
of disingenuousness arise. E.g., Bennett, subra note 23, at 1077-84; Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (1972). A process-oriented
approach can achieve the same ends. See pp. 1645-47 infra.
47. See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935) (security of
public bond may not be reduced without reason when public welfare may be served
by less severe impairment); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 434 (1934) (debtor-
relief law with no time, amount, circumstance, or need limits violates contract clause
when less severe impairment would serve public goals).
48. See, e.g., East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945) (no violation
when impairment is necessary in light of state judgments respecting complex economic
and financial affairs); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515
(1942) (no violation when impairment was carefully designed to serve state policies). Ob-
jective criteria perhaps cannot be formulated to determine the level of generality at
which policies must be articulated in order for means to be evaluated against them:
overly general policies may justify no particular means, and overly specific policies may
tautologically justify any given means. P. BREsT, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKINc 565-66 (1975). Yet, courts regularly assume "that a particular level of generality
. . . is appropriate." Id. at 566. Cf. H. LINDE, DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING 208-12 (1976)
(in evaluating means, courts faced with choice of ends at high or low level of generality).
Impairment is never absolutely necessary to fulfillment of a public purpose, for the
state can ultimately finance alternative programs itself; for example, a state can compensate
parties to contracts the value of whose performance it has diminished. United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 & n.16 (1977). The theoretical availability of that al-
ternative, however, has never alone justified invalidation of impairments; otherwise, no
impairment could be valid, except perhaps during an extraordinary public fiscal crisis.
See id. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather, states have been afforded "'wide discretion
... in determining what is and what is not necessary.'" City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379
U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965) (quoting East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945)).
49. Two additional principles have informed the Court's means-scrutiny. First, if the
state's commitment of contractual security was strong, the state must explain why its
position with respect to the necessity of impairment has changed since the contract was
made. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1977) (impairment
invalid absent demonstrated change of policy or circumstances since contract made); City
of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514-16 (1965) (impairment valid if policy and circum-
stances changed since contracts made).
Second, when costs are imposed upon individuals for the state's pursuit of a public
goal, the state must establish the appropriateness of the particular imposition. The ap-
propriateness requirement is responsive to concerns about fairness that pervade discus-




Legislation is retroactive if it impairs the obligation of a contract
entered into prior to the law's enactment. Two effects of retroactivity
caution against needless impairment: a retroactive law violates im-
plicit or explicit assurances of contractual security; and absent fair
warning of the law's passage, it upsets expectations."0 Nevertheless,
under the reserved power and inalienability doctrines, those effects
are sometimes justified. In particular, retroactive legislation is typically
aimed at problems caused by existing contracts; prospective legislation
in such cases would not serve the chosen public purpose.51
The legitimacy of an impairment depends upon whether it is neces-
sary to fulfill a public purpose.52 When a state dishonors a commit-
ment, the disruption of reliance interests has led the Court to con-
centrate on changes in the state's conception of public purpose or
necessity that have occurred since the contract was made.5 3 In a po-
26, § 9-6, at 469 (Constitution suggests general principle that "there exist limits on the
degree to which government can sacrifice some individuals to serve the ends of others"
(footnote omitted)); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1165, 1226 (1967) (takings
clause is "the visible, formal [expression] . . . of society's commitment to fairness").
50. See Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
51. For example, in the circumstances that gave rise to Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), conditioning future mortgage contracts to permit delayed
repayments in the event of widespread financial hardship would not have served the
state's purpose of protecting already-insolvent mortgagors.
Though prospective legislation would only prevent a problem from arising anew, in
the long run such legislation may suffice to serve public purposes for certain types of
contract. For example, the early holding that the contract clause forbids modification
of corporate charters, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819), was eventually made ineffective as a constraint on public regulation of corporate
affairs by state adoption of statutes or constitutional provisions reserving the right to alter
or amend corporate charters. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 60, 86, 168-70 (adoption of
reservation clauses possibily "principal factor" in decline of contract clause).
Because state law defines the obligation of a contract, Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 256-59, 326 (1827), states could constitutionally adopt general reservation
clauses in their constitutions, formally conditioning all contracts-public and private-by
the state's power to interfere for a public purpose. Id. at 339 (Marshall, C. J., dissenting).
Given that states already have great flexibility under the reserved power and inalien-
ability doctrines, a formal disclaimer would be necessary only if a state intended to
impair contracts frequently. Because the economic insecurity that would result-both for
the state and for private parties-would be intolerably costly, states would not adopt
general reservations.
52. The selection of means to pursue a general end typically involves accommodation
of subsidiary ends; the public purpose of legislation encompasses the complex of public
policies. See H. LINDE, supra note 48, at 207-15; Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). Whether impairment is necessary to fulfill
a public purpose therefore depends upon whether enforcement of the contract conflicts
with the means chosen, assuming those means are themselves justified by public policies.
53. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1977) (impair-
ment invalid because of insufficient change of circumstances); City of El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497, 516 (1965) (impairment valid because of change of circumstances and policy).
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litical system that vests authority to determine public policy in peri-
odically elected legislatures, factual and policy judgments frequently
change. 4 If the basis of the state's initial assurances was that con-
tractual security was more important than, or had no effect upon,
other policies, dishonoring those assurances on public-purpose grounds
requires repudiation of the policy balance or alteration of the factual
assessment. The Court's attention to these changes suggests that ab-
sent such repudiation, the impairment is unnecessary and should be
blocked.
3. Burdened Class
In deciding that enforcement of a contract would be contrary to
the public interest, a state must determine who should bear the cost
of protecting that interest. Because alternatives always exist to im-
posing the costs on a class of contracting parties, the state can rarely
claim that pursuit of general goals absolutely requires impairment
of a particular contract. A state must therefore adopt some appro-
priate justification for imposing such costs on individuals in pur-
suing public goals.55 The usual justification relies on the notion of
54. In many instances, especially when the contract is long-term or affects third parties,
the determination that its enforcement is contrary to the public good requires knowledge
of consequences of the contractual arrangement that could not be confidently predicted.
See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (reinstatement rights on land
sales caused legal confusion over 50 year period); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
310 U.S. 32 (1940) (shareholder withdrawal rights would cause bank failure). Changing
conditions also may alter the public effect of the contractual arrangement. See, e.g.,
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (mortgagor-defaults became
widespread public problem during Depression); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248
U.S. 498 (1919) (residences encroached on originally isolated oil tanks). The legislature
may receive new information, perhaps because political forces gained sufficient strength
to bring a problem to the state's attention or to motivate new scrutiny. See, e.g., Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (employees drew legislature's attention
to pension problem); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) (railroad drew legisla-
ture's attention to highway maintenance). In addition, with time the state may exhaust
alternative means of protecting the interest at stake. See, e.g., United States Trust Co., v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (covenant repealed retroactively only after prospective
repeal found to be inadequate); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 498 (1965) (step-
by-step removal of reinstatement rights on land sale). Finally, public policies change so
that the state may adopt a particular public goal for the first time, or determine that
some existing goal is more important than it had deemed it earlier. See, e.g., Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (protection of mortgagors deemed more
urgent than earlier, and interference with private mortgage market deemed accept-
able); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (lotteries formerly authorized deemed
unacceptable).
55. The Court has not addressed the question of how costs may appropriately be
imposed separately from the question of whether impairment is necessary for pursuit
of the public purpose. Yet, the first question is conceptually distinct from the second
and has been of implicit importance in contract clause cases. See Allied Structural Steel Co.
v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978) (impairment invalid when "severe" costs of legislation
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the intended cost-bearer's causal responsibility for harm: 56 unless the
contract is impaired, the cost-bearer will take an affirmative step 57
harmful to other contracting parties, third parties, or the public at
large.58
Though states rarely attempt to justify imposition of the costs of
impairment other than in terms of causal responsibility, 9 particular
circumstances may generate alternative justifications. 60 In such situa-
with "narrow aim" imposed only on employers); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 30, 31 & nn.28 & 29 (1977) (impairment invalid when less drastic alternatives avail-
able that would burden beneficiaries of transportation program rather than bondholders);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934) (imposition of costs
"appropriate" where mortgagor-relief is temporary, individually tailored, and equitable).
The appropriateness requirement is therefore a characterization of contract clause cases
that differs from the language of the opinions.
56. Cf. H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 61 (1959) ("causing harm
constitutes not only the most usual but the primary type of ground for holding per-
sons responsible"); Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 479 (1979) (principle that "a person may act without having to ac-
count for his actions to another . . . [but) he cannot 'cause harm' to another" is funda-
mental to legal responsibility).
57. An act is required in order justifiably to attribute causal responsibility to the
cost-bearer. Cf. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 53-54 (1979) (act requirement in nuisance law insures recognition of
personal freedom and autonomy).
58. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (mortgagees
would foreclose on mortgagors); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170
(1921) (landlords would evict tenants).
59. There may be several reasons why the state advances no causal-responsibility
justification. There may be no harm that the state wishes to prevent, but rather a more
positive goal to be pursued. Alternatively, there may be a harm, but the -cost-bearers may
not be responsible. No single group may be identified as responsible, or a group other
than the group of cost-bearers may be responsible. In the latter case, the state must
advance an especially strong justification for why costs are not imposed on those re-
sponsible for the harm. If causal responsibility is the strongest justification for imposing
costs, special explanation is required when it is not used.
In United States Trust Co., for example, it was arguable that no distinguishable class
was responsible for the complex of energy, environmental, and urban transportation
problems at which impairment was directed. 431 U.S. at 28-30. Conversely, if automobile
drivers could justifiably be distinguished as causing a substantial part of those problems,
the legislative decision not to impose costs on them is suspect, especially given that such
an imposition appeared to be feasible. Id. at 30 n.29. In response, it is arguable that the
hardship that would be worked on drivers by such alternatives to bond-covenant repeal
as raising bridge toils were considered by the state sufficient reason to dismiss those
alternatives, because drivers already faced high gasoline prices and their need to use
bridges was relatively inflexible.
Similarly, it is difficult to characterize the mere holding of reinstatement rights by
the defaulted land purchasers in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 498 (1965), as
causing harm, given that one of the state's purposes was to improve the property tax
base. Id. at 512-13.
60. Cf. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1977) (describing and
analyzing alternative justifications for fairness of government actions affecting property
rights); Michelman, supra note 49 (same). Because contract rights are property, theories
applicable in the property rights context-for example, utilitarian and rights-based
theories-should also apply in contract clause cases. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 88 (1977).
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tions, the state must articulate a theory to justify the appropriateness
of imposing costs. 61 The cost-bearer may be singled out as the pri-
mary obstacle to achievement of the public purpose. The state may
adopt a cost-benefit or other utilitarian justification,62 or may em-
phasize the spreading or avoidance of costs. 3 Alternatively, the state
may impose costs on those who have profited from an activity that is
subject to the regulation. 64 If the state cannot meet the burden of
establishing the appropriateness of its means of imposing costs to pursue
its public purpose, a court may invalidate the challenged legislation
and require the state to adopt alternative means.
C. Institutional Role: Judicial Deference and Political Checks
The text of the contract clause appears to make it an appropriate
candidate for judicial interpretation without great deference to legis-
lative judgments. 3 Contract clause doctrine, however, has established
that impairment is justified when necessary for achievement of a pub-
lic purpose. Application of the clause thus requires only policy judg-
ments66 and factual assessments 67 that the Court has repeatedly deemed
inappropriate for the judiciary to make." The tentative and speula-
61. Alternative means must be evaluated in the context of the legal constraints and
subsidiary policies constraining the state's action. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasonable for state to conclude
no alternative to repeal of bond covenant).
62. Cf. B. ACKERAMAN, supra note 62, at 41-70 (applying utilitarian analysis to takings
problem). The size of the burden placed on the cost-bearer would figure significantly in
any utilitarian justification. Thus, a utilitarian theory might have justified the nominal
impairment in United States Trust Co. But see 431 U.S. at 29 (rejecting utilitarian
approach).
63. Cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976) (law requiring
coal mine operators to compensate former employees for black lung disease upheld as
rational measure to spread costs of disabilities).
64. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965) (impairment upheld
as preventing speculative gains from holding reinstatement rights); Gelfert v. National
City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1941) (same).
65. Indeed, Professor Ely reads the contract clause as one of the few constitutional
provisions that single out a substantive value for special protection from the political
process. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 92 (1980).
66. These choices may include adopting the protection of private interests as a public
purpose; deciding in other situations what constitutes harm or what is a public goal;
weighing the importance of subsidiary policies that affect the acceptability of alternative
means of pursuing a public goal; and assigning weights to competing claims in choosing
an appropriate distribution of costs.
67. These may include judgments about social and economic conditions, about the
likely effects of alternative means for achieving the public purpose within the constraints
of subsidiary policies, about the identity of those responsible for harm, and about the
impact of impairment on contracting parties.
68. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (for solely
economic regulation, "the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom
or desirability of legislative policy determinations'); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri,
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tive character of the required policy and factual judgments9 raises
substantial doubts about relative judicial competence70 and renders
them more appropriate for legislative decision. 71 Moreover, insofar as
the necessary policy choices require tradeoffs of competing public in-
terests, the limitation on judicial intrusion rests on basic tenets of
representative democracy.72 The Supreme Court has recognized these
342 U.S. 421, 423, 425 (1952) (state legislatures entitled to decide standards of public
welfare in areas where policy issues are debatable); cf. Brest, supra note 43, at 106-07
(under traditional due process and equal protection standards, political branches have
"1virtually plenary authority to choose which objectives to promote at the expense of
which others, and to determine what costs shall be incurred to promote the objectives
and on whom those costs shall be placed").
69. The nature of the policy judgments makes it impossible to separate clearly the
empirical from the normative; indeed, the idea of "policy determinations" typically en-
compasses judgments of both fact and value. In this respect, these judgments differ
significantly from fundamental-value choices, which may be both amenable to and better
made by judicial decision. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 1-17 (1979) (courts well-suited to give meaning to
constitutional values). Thus, the competence argument for a limited judicial role in
contract clause cases does not imply that courts should also refrain from "discovering
fundamental values."
70. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60, 64 (1973) (not for Court to
resolve empirical uncertainties underlying economic or social legislation); East N.Y. Say.
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945) (complex factual judgments, including necessity
of impairment, are not for judiciary); D. HoRowr-z, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 47
(1977) ("[t]raditionally, the courts have been modest about their competence to ascertain
social facts and ... have shielded themselves by ... deferring to the fact-finding abilities
of legislatures").
71. Thus, the argument that courts should defer to legislative judgments in contract
clause cases depends upon the conclusion that public purpose, appropriately declared and
defined, is paramount to private contractual expectations. For other constitutional provi-
sions, the extent to which deference is appropriate would depend on the governing
substantive standard. If "necessary to pursue a public purpose" is not the standard and if
fundamental interests are involved, or if the legislative judgments are within the com-
petence of the courts, deference may be inappropriate. To decide this issue for any
particular provision, therefore, requires analysis of the substantive meaning of that provi-
sion. Unlike Professor Ely's argument for limited judicial role, see J. ELY, supra note 65,
at 73-104, the argument here is not generally applicable to the Constitution as a whole.
72. See A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 19 ("[T]he policy-making power of representative
institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the
system.")
In applying constitutional provisions other than the contract clause, other principles
may counterbalance these tenets. Under such provisions as the First Amendment's pro-
tection of unpopular speech or the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure safeguards, a demo-
cratically determined public purpose may not justify infringement of an individual's
constitutionally identified rights. In those cases, the Court's interpretation of the Con-
stitution makes the definition and protection of fundamental interests against majori-
tarian interference a proper task for the judiciary. In addition, even under a provision
such as the due process clause that does not identify substantive values for constitutional
protection, an interpretation may be adopted-for example, the right to privacy identified
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)-that requires judicial identification of
values. When, however, the Court interprets a provision, as it has interpreted the contract
clause, to protect no fundamental interests against public power, the principles counter-
balancing the majoritarian tenets do not apply.
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institutional constraints in its contract clause jurisprudence 73 as in
other areas of constitutional law.74
Deference to legislatures rests on the assumption that policy de-
terminations and factual judgments must be trusted when the process
that generates them is functioning properly7 5 Such institutional con-
straints restrict judicial review to the process that produced the chal-
lenged legislation.7 6 This suggests that in contract clause jurispru-
dence, a process-oriented approach is appropriate.77
Process review is concerned with the predicate of judicial defer-
ence: that political processes effectively check the legislature's deci-
sions. Thus, a court applying process review would inquire whether
political processes provided all groups interested in challenged legis-
73. Prior to 1977, the Supreme Court's approach to contract clause cases rested upon
assumptions of extreme judicial deference to legislative judgments, see Note, supra note
12, at 387, similar to those supporting the Court's due process and lower-tier equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 491 (equal protection and economic
due process typically meant virtually no scrutiny). Recently, in reviving the clause, how-
ever, the Court has articulated its recognition of institutional role. See Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244, 247 (1978) (customary judicial deference to state
laws directed to social and economic problems creates presumption favoring legislative
judgment as to necessity and reasonableness of particular measure).
74. See Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MiCH. L. Rtv. 1162, 1179 (1977)
(validity of legislation under broad constitutional provisions depends upon appraisal ot
complex factual issues and subsidiary value choices within province of legislature).
75. A decision generated by a "deliberate" and "broadly representative political
process," id. at 1186-87, must be trusted as "the statement of a norm that can be said
to reflect the values of the society," id. at 1187. This is why judicial review is problematic
in a representative democracy. See A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 16-23. When societal norms
define the appropriate standard but the political branches are not functioning properly
to represent societal judgments, a court may decline to defer to the political branches, see
e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938) (suggesting exacting
judicial scrutiny when political processes deficient); Gunther, supra note 46, at 44 ("legis-
lative value choices warrant judicial deference so long as the people can have their say
in the public forum and at the ballot box").
76. Though it has not substituted process review for substantive review in contract
clause cases, the Court has, in deferring to legislative judgments, focused on several
aspects of the process that generated the challenged legislation. See, e.g., City of El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 511-13 (1965) (legislature's detailed factual reports demonstrated
necessity of impairment); East N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233-35 (1945) (ex-
tensive findings in legislative record supported necessity of impairment); Note, supra
note 12, at 399 (contract clause cases since Blaisdell all considered legislative attention
to interests of cost-bearers).
77. Some commentators have proposed process approaches for other constitutional
provisions. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 65, at 73-104 (recommending approach to constitu-
tional adjudication that would search for malfunction of political process); H. LINDE,
supra note 48, at 235-55 (recommending process approach to substantive due process).
Professor Ely's proposal rests on general arguments of constitutional theory. Justice Linde's
proposal rests on the unworkability of the rationality standard and on considerations re-
garding role. See H. LINDE, id. at 201-35. His argument, which proceeds by analyzing
the substantive standards appropriate for a particular provision and considering both
practical and theoretical arguments concerning the appropriate scope of judicial review
under the provision, is thus similar in structure to the argument presented here.
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lation with an effective means of representing their interests.78 In
contract clause cases, process review would require the legislature
to give full consideration to the interests of the cost-bearing group.79
Such an approach could protect against irresponsible decisions; it
also would provide legislatures with the substantive flexibility that
contract clause principles require.
III. The Failure of Existing Standards
The existing approaches to contract clause jurisprudence use tests
based on reasonableness, foreseeability, or balancing. None, however,
conforms to the principles governing the scope of public power or
institutional role. A fourth approach, involving a least drastic means
standard, may be less intrusive than the other three, but it invites in-
appropriate judicial application.
A. Reasonableness
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,80 the Court re-
lied on a reasonableness standard to uphold legislation against a con-
tract clause challenge.81 Although that standard has never been clearly
defined, the Court has used it to substitute its own judgment for that
of the legislature as to the propriety of an accommodation of contract
rights and competing public interests. 8 2 The reasonableness standard
78. Professor Ely's process approach focuses not on individual legislative actions, but
rather on systematic disregard of groups' interests. See J. ELY, supra note 65, at 101, 103
(process malfunctions when minorities are "systematically disadvantaged"). In this respect,
it differs from a process approach that requires consideration of all affected interests
on each occasion of legislative action.
79. What constitutes full consideration would vary with the circumstances. If a group
is an easy target for imposition of costs, for example, a court may insist upon especially
careful legislative attention to the interests of that group. In part because of their in-
dependence from political processes, courts are well-suited to determine when that process
has malfunctioned to the detriment of a poorly represented group. See J. ELY, supra note
65, at 103; Bennett, supra note 23, at 1069.
80. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
81. Id. at 438 (question is "whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end
and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end").
82. In applying the reasonableness standard in Blaisdell, the Court supplemented the
legislative findings with judicial notice of the declared emergency and accepted the legiti-
macy of the state's end--"the protection of a basic interest of society." Id. at 445. The
Court concluded that the legislation was reasonable and valid because the relief afforded
mortgagors was temporary, limited to postponement of the mortgage obligation, and
fashioned with regard to the mortgagees' interests. Id. at 446-47,
In W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935), by contrast, the Supreme
Court invalidated a revision of the procedures that provided a remedy for default on
municipal improvement benefit assessments. The state's purpose was evidently to protect
owners of land who, because of the Depression, could not pay the benefit assessments. The
Court decided that the protection given the mortgagors was unreasonable and oppressive
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permits the Court to determine independently how urgent or wide-
spread a social problem is and whether its importance justifies con-
tractual impairment. The standard also permits courts independent-
ly to assess the efficacy of programs.83 In addition, its failure to
specify the principles relevant to constitutionality 84 may result in
decisions that ignore whatever principles are implicitly used. Finally,
although the reasonableness standard could be applied with deference
to legislative judgments, 5 it still would give legislatures no guidance
as to when, and with respect to which judgments, deference would be
accorded.8 6
B. Foreseeability
The foreseeability test of United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 7
accords dispositive weight to contract-based expectations. The test
because of its "studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his appropriate
protection." Id. at 60-62. Similarly, in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934),
the Court decided that exemption of life insurance policies from garnishment was un-
reasonable-contrary to the state's judgment that protection of that source of personal
security was best accomplished by blanket exemption.
83. In Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936), for example, the Court
found that restrictions on savings and loan association withdrawal rights served no public
purpose because the effect of the state's action was to adjust priorities among investors.
The Court's subsequent validation of similar priority adjustments in Veix v. Sixth Ward
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940), however, suggests that the Treigle Court merely
deemed the apparent public purpose-keeping savings and loan associations open despite
members' demands for withdrawal-unimportant in comparison to modification of the
members' contract rights.
84. A reasonableness standard might have various meanings. It could require a reason-
able balancing of values, with the more important ones given due consideration. Cf. W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (unreasonable to ignore value of mortgagee
protection). It could require that the legislature's factual judgments be those that reason-
able people with the same knowledge as the legislators would make. Cf. Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (both declaration of emergency and means
adopted reasonable). It could require simply that the judgments underlying the statute
not be irrational. See United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(commercial regulatory legislation constitutional if it rests upon rational basis within
knowledge and experience of legislators).
85. Though the Supreme Court afforded great deference to legislative judgments
after 1937, see note 13 supra, nothing in the reasonableness standard requires deferential
application. In contract clause cases, as in other contexts, such a standard has been used
to invalidate legislation that a deferential court might have upheld. See note 82 supra
(citing contract clause cases); cf. Bennett, supra note 23, at 1054-55 nn.34 S: 35 (citing
cases invalidating laws under rationality standard).
86. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 119 (reasonableness standard "cannot be much of a
guide to legislators"); cf. H. LINDE, supra note 48, at 222 (courts should not invalidate
legislation unless government should have complied with constitutional rule or should
know how to comply in future).
87. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court contrasted the unreasonable covenant repeal with the
impairment upheld in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). In El Paso, the
conditions necessitating repeal were "unforeseen and unintended" and were not "reason-
ably to be expected." By contrast, in United States Trust Co., the need for mass transit
was "not a new development" and "not unknown," and circumstances had not changed
stlfficiently to have a "substantially different impact." 431 U.S. at 31-32. Though this
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provides that an impairment is invalid if the conditions that neces-
sitate it were foreseen and intended to be covered by the terms of
the contract. The test thus fully enforces the expectations of the
parties.88
Although the foreseeability test focuses on an important interest
in contract clause cases, it provides excessive protection for that in-
terest. By granting absolute protection to expectations enforceable un-
der ordinary contract law, the foreseeability test ignores the reserved
power and inalienability doctrines. The test also violates the prin-
ciple that expectations may be upset by retroactive legislation when
a change of policy occurs, even if that policy change was easily
foreseeable.89
As applied in United States Trust Co., the foreseeability test would
also allow the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the legis-
lature as to when circumstances had changed-precisely the sort of
tentative, unverifiable assessment of social conditions that the Court
should not make.90 A foreseeability test would be inappropriate even
for a legislature, for it elevates contractual expectations to a protected
status that is inconsistent with important principles of contract clause
doctrine.
C. Balancing
The defects of the balancing approach used in Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus9' are similar to, but even more extreme than,
language leaves it unclear whether the conditions necessitating impairment need actually
to have been foreseen or whether foresceability suffices, both the concurrence and the
dissent characterize the test as one of foreseeability. See id. at 32 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) (state must show that it "did not know and could not have known" impact of
contract on state interest); id. at 59-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's "fore-
seeability" test).
88. Implicit in the Court's reliance upon a finding of insufficient change of circum-
stances to justify impairment is the notion that a contract contains an implied condition
that certain conditions would remain relatively constant. If those conditions change suf-
ficiently, the implied condition is defeated and the contract is frustrated. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 285 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974).
89. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (upholding
foreseeable policy change in bank regulation); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879)
(upholding foreseeable policy change regarding lotteries one year after public chartering
of lottery).
90. The Court's finding in United States Trust Co. that environmental and energy
problems had not changed enough to justify repeal of the bond covenant was supported
only by the bold assertion that any changes in these problems "were of degree and not
of kind." 431 U.S. at 32. The Court might have meant that in light of the available
alternatives to repeal, the legislature's support for its claim of changed circumstances was
inadequate. Though such a gloss would obviate the institutional role objection to the
foreseeability test, the objection that it is the wrong standard, regardless of how applied,
would remain.
91. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). The Court considered six factors gleaned from earlier contract
clause cases. The Court found that the impact on Allied was severe, sudden, permanent,
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those of the reasonableness standard. Although the reasonableness test
might articulate standards that a legislature could employ, the balanc-
ing approach requires no standards at all for deciding how much
weight to give to reliance interests, public harm, and the like. Judi-
cial balancing displaces legislative judgments completely: in each case,
it requires a de novo determination of the balance that should be
struck between competing interests.
Courts, however, should not make such judgments. 92 Nonprincipled
jurisprudence is particularly harmful in contract clause cases, in which
the Court is especially vulnerable to charges of undue solicitude for
particular economic interests. 93 In addition, as Spannaus illustrates,
a balancing approach provides no basis for evaluating future decisions
for consistency and little guidance for legislators attempting to obey
constitutional commands.
D. Least Drastic Means
A least drastic means test 94 is theoretically consistent with the prin-
ciple that expectations should be protected when possible but may
be defeated when they conflict with pursuit of a public purpose. When
such a conflict exists, the test requires that the costs of pursuing the
public purpose be imposed less drastically on parties to the contract
than on anyone else. If the appropriateness of imposing costs is a
factor in determining severity, the least drastic means test may be a
proper test for a legislature to use in contemplating an impairment.
Problems arise when courts apply the test. The least drastic means
test purports to avoid judicial ends-testing, in that it accepts the leg-
islature's ends and inquires only whether the means adopted to pur-
sue them are the least drastic. But in deciding which means are
least drastic, a court may overturn the legislative accommodation of
secondary policy judgments95 in favor of its own evaluation of their
and unanticipated, and that the law's purpose and coverage were narrow. Without ex-
pressly labeling its method "balancing," the Court weighed those findings and invalidated
the law.
92. See pp. 1636-38 supra (contract clause principles permit wide latitude for legis-
lative policy judgments).
93. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 50 (Spannaus Court, "in its eagerness to protect
even the slimmest of contract-related expectations of the corporation, was all too willing
to leave the contract-related expectations of workers to the mercy of corporate power").
Because laws challenged in contract clause cases frequently protect one contracting party's
interests at the expense of another's, the Court's preferences may be more starkly presented
than in other constitutional economic rights cases.
94. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977) (impairment
invalid when goals could be served by "less drastic modification" or by "alternative
means" not modifying covenant).
95. See H. LINDE, supra note 48, at 212 (policy results from accommodation of com-
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relative importance.96 In addition, a court will often rely upon its
own assessment of the cost and efficacy of alternative means.97 Never-
theless, if it were applied with consistent deference toward legislative
balancing of primary and subsidiary policies, the least drastic means
test might be consistent with the prevailing principles of contract
clause jurisprudence. 9
In sum, all of the existing approaches to judicial interpretation of
the contract clause inadequately respect important principles of con-
tract clause jurisprudence. The foreseeability test emphasizes expecta-
tions to the exclusion of the need to pursue public purposes. The reason-
ableness and balancing approaches provide courts with no principles
by which to decide cases and permit unconstrained judicial value
choice. And the least drastic means standard, though a potentially
useful standard for legislatures, typically results in inappropriate
judicial policymaking.
IV. A Framework for Contract Clause Jurisprudence
The principles of contract clause jurisprudence outlined above99
suggest that a process-oriented approach would be preferable to ex-
isting analyses. Under this approach, the justification required of a
peting and inconsistent values); Note, supra note 52, at 144 ("seemingly straightforward
statutes can involve goals that reflect an accommodation of various purposes which are
determined by subtle or blatant policy trade-offs").
96. See Bennett, supra note 23, at 1065 (judicial value judgments unavoidable in
evaluating costs, benefits, and alternatives). Given that "for any given regulation, there is
almost always available an imperfect less restrictive alternative-provided that one is
willing to tolerate increasing costs and inefficiencies," P. BRXST, supra note 48, at 993, a
court can nearly always justify invalidating challenged legislation on these grounds. In
doing so, however, the Court decides-often contrary to the legislative decision-that the
resulting costs and inefficiencies are less "drastic" or "restrictive" than the impairment.
97. In determining that the least drastic alternative test had not been met in United
States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 30-31 & n.29, for example, the Court hardly considered
secondary policies and legal constraints on alternative means. See 431 U.S. at 38-40
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather, the Court found it sufficient to note that the state
had failed to show why an "evident and more moderate course" was not practical. Id.
at 31. If the Court meant that the state had not provided adequate support for its judg-
ment, its use of the least drastic means test may comport with constraints on judicial value
choice. Otherwise, the test would intrude on legislative decisions regarding subsidiary
policies.
98. In United States Trust Co., the Court hinted at a proper use of the least drastic
means test: "a State is not completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its
own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives." Id. at 30-31. Once contractual
security is given such priority, a burden might be placed on states to explain interference
with this higher interest when alternative means that interfere with other interests seem
to be available. Such an approach would give courts a starting point for evaluating the
alternatives as more or less drastic, but it would not justify refusal to defer to a particular
legislative determination that contractual security should be sacrificed.
99. See pp. 1627-39 suPra.
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legislature would vary with the relative weight of the substantive
principles governing expectations and public power.
A. Threshold Inquiry
The preliminary stage of a court's analysis should be to determine
whether the case involves a contract rather than some other form of
legal interest. °00 If a contract is involved, the court must determine
whether, in the ordinary contract-law sense-that is, ignoring con-
stitutional considerations-it has been impaired. The court would
inquire whether, but for the challenged state law, either the full
obligation of all parties would have been met' 0 ' or a state remedy
would have been available to compensate for non-performance of a
contractual obligation. 0 2 A negative answer would signify that the
state has not interfered with the contract in violation of its tacit or
express assurances of security.103
100. In private-contract cases this issue rarely arises, though obligations deriving from
marriage and some court judgments have been held not to be contracts for purposes of the
contract clause. See Hale, supra note 20, at 621-28. In public-contract cases, the complain-
ing party may have relied upon an action of the state and therefore claim that the state
entered into a contract. The state might deny this, arguing that its action merely estab-
lished a policy that persons could take advantage of only as long as the policy survived.
See, e.g., Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903) (distinguishing policy from
contract). In such cases, a court should follow ordinary contract law principles and look
to the circumstances of the state's action to decide whether a contract was made. Compare
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (teacher tenure law created contract)
with Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937) (teacher tenure law created no contract).
101. Under either a consideration or a reliance theory of contract, imposition of un-
bargained-for obligations also may constitute an impairment. See Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 n.16 (1978) (contract clause not restricted to reduction
of obligations).
102. This characterization of the threshold inquiry would encompass a state's breach
of its own contract when, because of the defense provided by the challenged state law,
state courts could not grant relief. E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1 (1977) (breach of bond covenant); Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215
U.S. 170 (1909) (breach of debt contract).
103. In determining what degree of interference rises to the level of impairment, a
court would face a variety of problems. Alterations of remedy would raise the question
of whether an equivalent substitute has been provided. See, e.g., Richmond Mortgage &
Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937) (upholding alteration in
method of determining fair value on foreclosure sale). Nominal interference with con-
tractual terms would raise the question of whether some real loss in value must occur
to constitute an impairment. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1 (1977) (bond covenant repeal is impairment despite questionable severity of loss in
value and existence of secondary market). In any case, the threshold inquiry need not be
rigid; because the inquiry focuses on damage to reliance and expectation interests, minimal
intrusion on these interests should permit further judicial investigation at the next stage.
The magnitude of the infringement of reliance and expectation interests becomes rele-
vant when the necessity and appropriateness justifications are examined.
1644
Contract Clause
B. The Elements of Process Scrutiny
Process scrutiny differs from the existing approaches to contract
clause jurisprudence in that it recognizes the constraints on institu-
tional role that caution against independent judicial determination
of the public interest. If the legislature is functioning properly, se-
lection of a public purpose and determinations of necessity and ap-
propriateness should be left to it. Even if the legislative process is
inadequate, the proposed approach would invalidate legislation only
on process grounds, leaving open the possibility that the legislature
could reenact the legislation after remedying the defects in process. 04
Judicial determination of the adequacy of process would focus on
two related questions: whether the legislature made the judgments
necessary to support the validity of the impairment, 10 5 and whether
political processes functioned effectively to provide all interested par-
ties with a fair opportunity to argue their cases or to challenge an
adverse decision. 10 The requisite legislative judgments would depend
upon whether a public or private contract is at issue.' 07 The ade-
quacy of process would depend upon the grounds for suspecting insuf-
ficient legislative consideration of the interests of a burdened group.
Requiring explicit judgments in order to justify an impairment
could render political checks effective for several reasons. Explicit-
ness would enhance legislative responsibility by opening the action
104. Cf. Brest, supra note 43, at 126 (noting possibility that motivation review may
result in reenactment); Sandalow, supra note 74, at 1189 (recommending "[g]iving judicial
decisions the effect of suspensive vetoes"). In many cases, the legislature might not re-
enact the law. That might occur because the need for it would have passed, see, e.g.,
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 248 n.21 (1978) (noting preemption
by federal legislation), or because the required judgments either could not be supported
factually, see, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (requiring
judgment that covenant repeal be only available means to solve mass transit problem), or
would be unconstitutional, see, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)
(requiring judgment that teachers could be dismissed for engaging in protected speech).
In addition, reenactment may not occur because the legislators would find it politically
impossible to make the required judgments explicit. See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (requiring judgment that life insurance companies were
major beneficiaries of law).
105. The required judgments are that there is a public purpose to which enforcement
of the contract presents an obstacle and that it is appropriate to impose the costs of
pursuing the public purpose on parties to impaired contracts. See pp. 1630-39 supra.
106. See J. SALOMA, CONGRESS AND THE NEW PoLITIcs 71 (1969) (political responsibility
exists when legislature is accountable for actions and when all interests considered in
making decision); Gunther, supra note 46, at 44 (political processes functioning properly
when interests are heard and electorate checks decisions). Lack of access to the public
and lack of access to its representatives tend to go hand-in-hand, for legislators generally
have little interest in the views of a group that has no practical effect on their political
survival. See W. KEEFE &- M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 316 (4th ed. 1977).
107. See pp. 1647-49 infra.
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and its supporting judgments to public criticism and electoral re-
sponse.'08 Explicitness would also constrain legislators more directly
by forcing them to predict their constituents' reaction and to analyze
more fully the justification for their action.109 By articulating the
policy and factual judgments implicit in their decisions, legislators
would invite more immediate and effective criticism from fellow legis-
lators and other persons who monitor and influence legislation.110
A court applying process review in contract clause cases would
have to decide when to doubt that the legislature had fully considered
the interests of all concerned parties."' The legislative process might
fail in two ways. First, the legislature could rely upon public willing-
ness to accept the particular legislation even though it has not made
the judgments necessary to support the impairment."12 Second, the
burdened group could be politically weak or an easy target for the
imposition of costs and hence chosen to bear those costs without fair
108. See L. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES 29 (1977) (fundamental
to political accountability that public know about legislative judgments); cf. THE FED-
.RALIST No. 63, at 383 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[r]esponsibility . . . in order
to be effectual, must relate to operations .... of which a ready and proper judgment
can be formed by the constituents").
109. See M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
7-8 (3d ed. 1977) (deliberation ensures time and opportunity for variety of interests to be
heard); Sager, Insular Maiorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1411-13 (1978) (legislative deliberation
essential for making reasonable and fair judgments).
110. Unless legislation deals with one of the few controversial issues that generate
single-issue constituencies, it is likely to remain relatively unimportant in the political
process. See W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 106, at 263 ("[t]he more controversial the
issue, the greater the possibility that the processes of legislative bargaining and adjust-
ment will be exposed to public view and consideration"). But overall voting patterns of
legislators are a focus of electoral concern, and any given issue can be pinpointed for
public comment if those with a direct interest in its resolution are aware of it. See M.
JEWELL & S. PATrERSON, supra note 109, at 289-90 (importance of lobbyists in communica-
tions between organized constituents and legislators).
111. Even with ideal process-all interests fully considered and competing values recog-
nized, reasonable grounds for believing in the necessity and appropriateness of impair-
ment, and decisions made sufficiently public to ensure that the public could challenge
them-a group's interests could still be defeated. The mere fact of defeat, therefore, would
not necessarily signal invalid process.
112. A legislature may make a politically popular decision without making the neces-
sary policy and factual judgments to justify impairment. When, as in contract clause cases,
the Constitution has made the legislature responsible for mediating majority sentiment
with judgments of "reasonability and fairness," reliance on public ratification of the
result does not respect the need for a deliberate process. See Sager, supra note 109, at 1411-
13. When political processes cannot be expected to challenge the legislature's action, there-
fore, a court should demand stronger evidence of full legislative consideration of the
required judgments.
In United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. 1 (1977), for example, the Court could justifiably
believe, absent conflicting evidence, that the fairest means of financing mass transit im-
provements would impose costs widely on drivers. Because that means would have been
politically unpopular and because the covenant repeal was politically safe, the Court could
reasonably require strong legislative support for the claim that covenant repeal was the
most appropriate means of solving the mass transit problem. See p. 1650 infra.
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attention to its interests."13 Failure of the process in either respect
would warrant suspicion that the legislative decision was not sup-
ported by public policies sufficient to justify an impairment."14
C. Requisite Legislative Judgments
Integration of the principles underlying the contract clause re-
quires separate consideration of public-contract cases and private-
contract cases in defining which judgments should suffice to justify
an impairment. In public-contract cases, the proposed approach re-
quires states to overcome the presumptive primacy of contractual
security; in private-contract cases no such presumption should be
established.
1. Public Contracts
In a public-contract case, a court should presume that impairment
of the contract upset legitimate expectations. In entering into the
contract, the state negotiated its terms and committed itself expressly
to honoring the contract. As a consequence of this express commit-
ment, other parties are strongly justified in relying upon enforce-
ment of the contract. The stricture against the state's breaking its
word therefore applies with great force. Impairment defeats a jus-
tified reliance interest, and courts should therefore require a legis-
lature to address explicitly its failure to keep its word.
To justify the impairment, the state must find that enforcement
of the contract conflicts with pursuit of a public goal and that im-
position of the costs on the complaining party is appropriate. Courts
should presume that the state continues to adhere to the policy and
factual judgments implicit in the initial contractual undertaking., 5
To overcome that presumption, the legislature must specify policies
113. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (extra-
ordinary judicial scrutiny appropriate when group burdened and when political checks
will not function effectively); Sandalow, supra note 74, at 1188 (legislative decision not
representative of public policies if it is product of partial political pressures not broadly
reflective of whole society). In Spannaus, for example, the challenged legislation appeared
to have been passed quickly in response to the requests of one employee group. Id. at
247-48. This suggests that there was inadequate opportunity for employers to present
their case.
114. Professor Ely's argument that requiring explicitness would not enhance account-
ability assumes that, to meet such a requirement, the most general purposes would be
written into statutory preambles or committee reports, and that stricter standards would
block much desirable legislation. See J. ELY, supra note 65, at 127-29. A process approach
that focused on factual support for legislative conclusions and specified the interests that
must be addressed would avoid this objection.
115. Because the state had an opportunity when entering the contract to bargain
for conditions to meet future contingencies, there is an implicit understanding in the
state's commitment that the contract conflicted with no public policy.
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or conditions that have changed, or new information that has come
forth, since the making of the contract.
In addition to identifying the conflict, the state should be required
to justify the fairness of impairing particular contracts to pursue
the public purpose. 1 6 In situations in which the state cannot per-
suasively identify the burdened party as responsible for harm, it
could attempt to justify the appropriateness of the impairment on
some other theory."17
The adequacy of a legislature's support for its judgments would
depend on the ability of interested parties to use political processes
effectively to present their interests. The complaining party would
be able to rebut the legislative judgments by establishing that the
process was inadequate. 118 If a court found reason to doubt that
political processes ensure the genuineness of any of these legislative
judgments,"0 the impairment should be blocked . 2 0
116. If, as in most cases, the purpose is prevention of harm for which the com-
plaining party would be causally responsible, then it is fair to restrict performance of
the contract. In such cases, the judgments of harm and of responsibility typically involve
direct action within the context of a common legal relationship and are therefore simple.
See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (employer termina-
tion of employee without pension); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934) (mortgagee foreclosure on mortgagor).
117. In adopting and applying a fairness principle, the state would have to say why
no alternative imposition of costs is appropriate. Case-by-case experience would inform
the courts as to which justifications would be more likely to be advanced disingeneously
and therefore should be subject to more stringent process requirements. In United States
Trust Co., for example, the Court found that the states paid insufficient attention to
several obvious alternative cost-bearers, 431 U.S. at 30-31, perhaps because of the avail-
ability of bondholders as an easy "target" group. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
supra note 60, at 92 (bondholders constitute "target" group).
Factual judgments necessary to support a conclusion of fairness on a noncausal theory
would tend to require surveying alternative cost-imposition schemes, estimating relative
costs and benefits, and analyzing administrative costs. Such judgments would tend to be
more complex than the judgments of harm and responsibility required by the more
common fairness justification. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 30-31 (1977) (showing that no alternatives were available would require elaborate de-
scription of statutory constraints and of efficacy and costs of alternative means); City of
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 509-17 (1965) (impairment justification given detailed
factual support).
118. The cost-bearing class may point to its political weakness or isolation in attempt-
ing to show inadequate attention to the interests of the class, evidenced perhaps by failure
to hold hearings or by unsupported conclusions in the legislation.
119. When the fairness justification attributes to the cost-bearer causal responsibility
for some harm, the simplicity of the judgments involved makes legislative disingenuousness
unlikely. In other cases, in which the judgments are more complex, there are many
possible explanations for disingenuousness: politically weak or target groups may be avail-
able; the legislature may be covertly protecting or damaging private interests; and un-
supported but unchallengeable factual judgments may plausibly be advanced.
120. In United States Trust Co., the Court gave as its sole reason for less deference
in public-contract cases the fact that "the State's self-interest is at stake." 431 U.S. at 26.




In private-contract cases, courts should not presume the primacy
of contractual expectations. Because the state cannot be expected to
anticipate every private contract, tacit assurances that the contract
will be enforced cannot be treated as firm commitments. Impairment
of a private contract, therefore, does not violate strong strictures
against the state's breaking its word.121 In addition, because private
contracts are made about virtually every conceivable subject, almost
no legislation can escape upsetting some private contractual expec-
tations' 2 2 Courts therefore should not require a legislature to specify
intervening changes of condition, information, or policy that neces-
sitate impairment.
The state should, however, articulate the purpose that it claims
requires impairment and explain the selection of the particular means
chosen to pursue that purpose. In finding that pursuit of the goal
and enforcement of the contract are in conflict, and in determining
the fairness of imposing the costs upon contracting parties, the state
would make the same judgments in a private-contract case as in a
public-contract case. Those judgments would be subject to the same
constraints: adequate political process to ensure fair consideration
for interested parties, and stifficient explicitness and factual support
to allay suspicions of legislative disingenuity. The judgments would
also vary with the type of fairness justification being offered.1 23
D. Rethinking United States Trust Co. and Spannaus
Under the proposed process approach, United States Trust Co., a
public-contract case, was correctly decided. The threshold inquiry
the public-private contract line: in either case, if public funding is a likely alternative to
impairment, the public purse is in jeopardy. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra
note 60, at 89-90. Impairment of a public contract, however, always provides an oppor-
tunity to save state money; the state therefore may be tempted more readily to take
action without careful consideration of the costs of alternatives. But because this is true
for almost all state actions, public-contract impairments should not be distinguished
on this ground.
121. A state's general contract law is some assurance of security, but because it-like
any other law affecting the activity that a private contract concerns-is addressed to the
public at large and not to a particular individual, it is in the nature of a policy, not a
contract. See note 100 supra. It therefore gives rise to a much weaker estoppel argument.
If a general law authorizes state officials to make certain contracts, those contracts are
public contracts, to which a stronger estoppel claim applies.
122. See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 382 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (difficult to
conceive of laws not bearing directly or indirectly upon contractual obligations); Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 258-59 (1827) (same).
123. See note 117 supra.
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would find at most a technical impairment. 124 Furthermore, the state's
claim that energy, environmental, and transportation policies had be-
come significantly more important since 1962 was credible. 125 Never-
theless, the state's necessity and appropriateness justifications were
weak. Because obvious alternative means would have been politically
unpopular, 26 and because bondholders were a target group with
little political strength, 27 the process approach would require ex-
plicit support in the legislative record for judgments of necessity
and appropriateness -.2  Although the state might have shown neces-
sity by articulating relevant legal constraints and subsidiary policies,
20
and might have advanced a cost-benefit justification for imposing the
minimal burden on bondholders,13 0 its failure to demonstrate ade-
quate consideration of alternatives would justify invalidation.' 3 '
The Spannaus legislation, on the other hand, would be upheld
under the process approach. Interference with the pension agreement
would constitute an impairment, 132 but because a private contract
was involved, the state would not need to demonstrate changed circum-
stances or policies; it would merely have to show that the impairment
was necessary and appropriate. Though some evidence suggested hur-
ried passage, 33 the legislation was of a sufficiently common variety
34
124. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1977); id. at 41-44
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on detailed findings of trial court).
125. The opinion does not make clear how much legislative attention was focused on
these changes. The dissenting opinion, however, sets out some of the evidence to support
the claim of changed circumstances and policies. 431 U.S. at 40-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The state could have introduced a wide variety of socioeconomic evidence to establish a
heightened concern over environmental, energy, and mass transit problems.
126. See id. at 30 nn.28 9- 29 (suggesting bridge and tunnel tolls and taxes on gasoline
or parking).
127. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 60, at 92.
128. Because bondholders performed no act under the covenant that caused any of
the energy or environmental harms that the repeal was aimed at undoing, the state could
not plausibly argue that the bondholders were responsible for harm. The state therefore
would have the more difficult burden of advancing a different appropriateness justification.
129. See 431 U.S. at 38-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing legal constraints and
policies behind adoption of means).
130. The minimal burden imposed on bondholders might have been judged a smaller
cost than the social cost of imposing extra burdens on drivers.
131. Id. at 29-31 & nn.28 & 29 (describing alternatives state should have addressed).
132. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1978); see note 101
supra (increasing obligations may constitute impairment).
133. Hurried passage might be inferred from the district court's finding that the need
for a pension law was brought to the legislature's attention by one plant's employees and
that the new law took effect immediately. 438 U.S. at 247-48. That the state evidently
knew that its law would be preempted by federal legislation within one year, id. at 248
n.21, might also generate suspicion; but the state may legitimately meet a temporary
problem with temporary legislation.




and was carefully enough drafted' 35 that the political process could
be found to be functioning properly. Finally, a court could easily
find that the state was protecting employees' reliance interests from
actions of their employers that would harm those interests. 130 The
law therefore would be validated.
Conclusion
The process approach proposed in this Note would return to legis-
latures primary authority to resolve conflicts between public power
and private expectations-authority that the recent revival of the
contract clause has eroded. Although the new activism would thus
be halted, the restoration of legislative authority would be accom-
panied by stringent requirements as to the process by which legis-
latures exercised that authority. The approach would foster respon-
sible political processes and would direct courts to focus on the
legislature's responsibility in making the public policy judgments upon
which contract clause cases depend.
135. See id. ("nan-ow aim" explained by fact that large employers' pension plans
create problem of employee reliance).
136. See id. at 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (both terms of Act and opinion of State
Supreme Court disclose intent to remedy serious social problem arising from operation
of private pension plans). The purpose of the pension law was evident and should not
have been ignored by the Court. Id. at 246-48 & nn.18 & 19. It may even be argued that
some element of fault was present in employers' actions concerning their'pension plans.
Id. at 252-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (employers mislead employees and inadequately
fund pension plans).
1651

